Even within a single knowledge representation system there are often many different ways to model a given domain and formalise a reasoning problem specified over the domain. In particular, two knowledge descriptions can be semantically equivalent even if they are expressed in quite different languages or vocabularies. This paper proposes and studies a concept of synonymy that applies to equivalent theories formulated in distinct vocabularies. We suggest a set of general desiderata or criteria of adequacy that any reasonable synonymy concept should satisfy. We then analyse a specific concept of synonymy within answer set programming (ASP), a framework that is currently being applied with success in many areas of knowledge technology. We characterise this concept in different ways, show that it satisfies the prescribed criteria of adequacy, and illustrate how it can be applied to a sample problem arising in knowledge representation and reasoning. As a logical framework we use quantified equilibrium logic based on a firstorder version of the logic of here-and-there. This serves as an adequate formal foundation for ASP and allows us to obtain a logical account of the synonymy relation.
Introduction
This paper is about how different descriptions of a piece of knowledge may be equivalent even if they are expressed in different vocabularies or signatures. It is a type of problem that arises in many disciplines. In logic and the foundations of mathematics one can formalise the idea that mathematical theories, say from algebra, geometry, number theory or set theory, can be presented in various ways using different primitive concepts. In the philosophy of science one is often interested in how equivalent scientific concepts can arise from apparently different theories, how one and the same theory might be expressed or logically reconstructed in distinct ways, or how, as in wave-particle duality in physics, apparently alternative or even rival descriptions of knowledge might actually be partly or fully equivalent. In software engineering one may be faced with the problem of transforming a piece of code written in one programming language into "equivalent" code written in a completely different language. More generally, compiler design faces this task in a systematic fashion. In highly distributed, multi-agent systems, agreement technologies may be needed to determine when agents are using differ-✩ Partially supported by the MICINN project TIN2006-15455 and TIN2009-14562-C05. This paper is a substantially extended and modified version of a workshop contribution of the authors at the CENT 2007 workshop in Pheonix that appeared in the informal proceedings of that event.
1. Operator splitting. In certain kinds of planning problems Kautz and Selman [17] showed that it is advantageous to split an n-place predicate into several predicates of smaller arity. For instance, instead of using the predicate move (x, y, z, i) to say that x is moved from y to z at time i, they use three predicates
object(x, i) ∧ source( y, i) ∧ destination(z, i).
In this case the practical concern is to speed up search. Similar examples of relational splitting occur in areas of machine learning. 2. Action attribute symbols in causal action theories [18] . The use of action attributes is very similar to the first case, but now the aim is to improve elaboration tolerance; i.e. to make the theory easier to modify when new objects and new scenarios are introduced. In the famous problem of missionaries and cannibals, instead of cross(V , L) for V a vessel, and L a location, one writes
cross_in(V ), cross_to(L).
In [18] , Lifschitz analyses in the Causal Calculator many of the 19 variants of the missionaries and cannibals problem proposed by McCarthy. Using action attribute symbols he is able to show how each new scenario can be dealt with merely by the addition of new postulates. 3. Dual representations. Sometimes quite different representations of a problem come about because of a slight change of viewpoint. A relatively common example arises in Knowledge Representation when dealing with puzzle-like scenarios such as chess, 8-queens, n-puzzle, etc., where we have a board or an array and a set of possibly different pieces or tiles.
In these cases we can choose different representations that are in a sense dual to each other. For instance, considering the 8-puzzle, we can represent each tile T as a "main object" and its row X and column Y in the board as its attributes, so that we could have fluents like row(T , X) and column(T , Y ) that vary over time. A dual representation could consider instead each board cell (identified by the pair (X, Y )) as the main object, and its content as an attribute, so we would have a fluent like content( X, Y , T ). Actions may also have dual representations. For instance, in the same example and assuming that tiles are the main objects, we could decide to shift a tile T that is next to the empty position (the hole) so we have an action move_tile(T , D) in some direction ∈ {up, down, right, left}, or we could see the movement as a shift of the hole itself in the opposite direction with an action move_hole(D ), assuming that the hole is unique.
4.
Reification. In another example involving causal theories of action [19] Balduccini and Gelfond propose an architecture for a software agent that operates a physical device and is capable of monitoring, testing and repairing the device's components. They build a program to find candidate diagnoses using answer set programming. The problem is to compare two different but apparently equivalent ways to manage the preconditions of a law, one using lists (not available in most ASP implementations) and one without. The problem is described in detail in Section 6 below. 5. Quantifier elimination by introduction of auxiliary predicates. The standard ASP languages do not currently allow one to formulate rules containing explicit quantifiers within their bodies. However, as Cabalar [20] and Lee and Palla [21] have recently discussed, the use of existential quantifiers in rule bodies can lead to a more compact and intuitive modelling of a problem. For instance, as Cabalar mentions, in ASP one might formulate a typical default law of inertia arising in knowledge representation by means of these rules:
where V , W are potential values for a fluent F , and A and S range over actions and situations, respectively. The predicate ab is an auxiliary expression used to specify that there is some value of F different from V . In other words one could use the following, more succinct formulation:
removing the need for the predicate ab. An ASP semantics for such a use of existential quantification is readily given in equilibrium logic or within the general theory of stable models. Cabalar in [20] describes a general method for replacing these quantifiers by auxiliary predicates leading to rules that can be accepted by current ASP solvers. 10 The main problem is to show that the two representations are equivalent. 10 A similar technique has been implemented in [21] .
Aim of the paper
Our aim is to capture a concept of synonymy, or equivalence, for theories formulated in different vocabularies or signatures in the language of ASP. The framework we propose should be able to handle the kinds of intertheoretic equivalences arising in the above examples from knowledge representation and declarative problem solving. By using a logical reconstruction in QHT and equilibrium logic, we assume that there is single underlying logical language for ASP. Nevertheless, as we shall see from examples, we can also treat cases where differences of vocabulary arise partly out of differences in the underlying programming syntax of different ASP implementations. There are also many specialised languages built on top of ASP systems, such as the action language A, or the planning language K based on the DLV system. Again, as long as we know how to interpret these higher-level languages into basic answer set semantics, there should be no difficulty in treating problems of synonymy and equivalence for theories within or even across these special languages.
An important property of our concept of synonymy is that it should be robust under theory extensions. This is not a self-evident feature of equivalence concepts in nonmonotonic reasoning, where we do not have the usual replacement theorems. Let us consider the case of two theories formulated in the same vocabulary. They may have the same answer sets yet behave very differently once they are embedded in some larger context. For a robust or modular notion of equivalence one should require that programs behave similarly when extended by any further programs. This leads to the following concept of strong equivalence: programs Π 1 and Π 2 are strongly equivalent, in symbols Π 1 ≡ s Π 2 , if and only if for any Σ , Π 1 ∪ Σ is equivalent to (has the same answer sets as) Π 2 ∪ Σ . This has been recognised as providing an important conceptual and practical tool for program simplification, transformation and optimisation. Following its initial study in [22] , the concept of strong equivalence for logic programs in ASP has given rise to a substantial body of further work looking at different characterisations [23, 24] , new variations and applications of the idea [25] [26] [27] , as well as developing systems to test for strong equivalence [26, 28] . Recently, some of this work on program transformation [29, 30] has been extended to the first-order case. While strong equivalence and some related concepts are indeed robust, it is assumed that the programs being compared are formulated in the same vocabulary, or at least that any differences of vocabulary are semantically unimportant.
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As we can see from the kinds of examples mentioned in the previous section, this assumption is quite restrictive and not always realistic. It means that until now no systematic tools have been developed to check whether different representations are really semantically equivalent when they are intended to be.
While our technical characterisations of synonymy are specific to the framework of answer set programming, our general approach should be more widely applicable to other KRR and nonmonotonic formalisms. This is true in particular of the general criteria of adequacy that we propose for a synonymy concept. Even our specific methods, based on the theory of interpretations and Beth's Theorem, may be re-usable for other formalisms, if their underlying logics permit. These methods are adaptations of techniques already used in classical logic that cover examples from mathematics, as well as empirical theories from the natural or social sciences.
Outline and main results
We start following [31] by considering formal and informal desiderata that a concept of synonymy should fulfil. In Section 3 we then review quantified equilibrium logic and its relation to answer set semantics. We present the main characterisation of strong equivalence from [1] . In Section 4 we discuss the definability of concepts and interpretability between theories. In Section 5 we turn to our main question, how to define a strong concept of equivalence or synonymy for theories in quantified equilibrium logic. We give different characterisations of this concept and show that it fulfils the adequacy conditions discussed in Section 2. The main characteristics of this concept are as follows. Theories Π 1 and Π 2 in distinct languages are said to be synonymous if each is bijectively interpretable in the other. In particular, this means that there is faithful interpretation of each theory in the other and a one-one correspondence between the models of the two theories. This correspondence preserves the property of being an equilibrium model or answer set. In addition, Π 1 has a definitional extension that is strongly equivalent to a definitional extension of Π 2 . Moreover, in a suitable sense, Π 1 and Π 2 remain equivalent or synonymous when extended by the addition of new formulas.
As an illustration of our framework, in Section 6 we treat in detail an example from causal action theory applied to diagnostic problems. Section 7 discusses some further aspects of synonymy, while Section 8 reviews literature and related work. Conclusions are drawn in Section 9.
Synonymous theories
What does it mean to say that two theories, Π 1 and Π 2 , in different languages or signatures, L 1 and L 2 , are synonymous? We consider six desiderata D1-D6 that we believe should be satisfied by any basic concept of synonymy. They are quite general and should be applicable to any theories describing or modelling some knowledge domain; notice that D4 takes account of the special nature of a nonmonotonic knowledge representation and reasoning system. D1. Translatability. The language L 1 of Π 1 should be translatable, via a mapping, say τ , into the language L 2 of Π 2 . The translation τ should uniformly reflect the structure of the source language, so we require it to be recursive. 
The first two conditions provide the cornerstone of any formal approach to intertheory relations. Different kinds of relations between theories are obtained by specifying additional conditions that the mappings should satisfy (see e.g. [32] [33] [34] ). In our case, the two languages use standard first-order syntax in a non-classical underlying logic. So in our framework of ASP, the L 1 , L 2 -structures are non-classical models for the logic of here-and-there. The remaining conditions express different kinds of equivalence requirements. For example D4 is needed by the fact that our logical framework is nonmonotonic and therefore special selected or minimal models are singled out. D5 expresses a key property of the synonymy relation, and D6 ensures that synonymy satisfies certain modularity properties and is robust under theory extensions. With D3 we express the idea that both theories should represent essentially the same knowledge. This informal requirement will be made precise later on in Proposition 10.
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly we approach the problem of synonymy via an adaptation of the classical theory of interpretations. Briefly we shall say that theories are synonymous if each is faithfully and bijectively interpreted in the other; this is basically the standard approach followed in classical predicate logic, see e.g. [35, 36] . We adapt it here to the case of a nonmonotonic system based on a non-classical logic.
Review of quantified equilibrium logic and answer set semantics
We assume the reader has some familiarity with the usual definition of stable model or answer set semantics for logic programs [37] as well as the way in which answer sets can be used to encode and solve different kinds of reasoning problems [9] . As a logical framework for ASP we use the logic of here-and-there and its nonmonotonic extension (quantified) equilibrium logic. For the propositional version of the logic HT of here-and-there and an overview of propositional equilibrium logic, see [38] . Usually in quantified equilibrium logic we include a second, strong negation operator as occurs in several ASP dialects. In this paper we shall restrict attention to the language with a single negation symbol, '¬'. In particular, we shall work with a quantified version of the logic HT, with the usual logical constants '¬', '∧', '∨', '→', quantifiers '∀', '∃', and the defined constant '↔'. In other respects we follow the treatment of [12] .
For the remainder of the paper we consider languages L = C , F , P , built over a set of constants, C , a set of functions, F , and a set of predicates, P ; the three sets of symbols are disjoint and each predicate symbol and each function symbol has an assigned arity. Atoms and formulas are constructed as usual; closed formulas, or sentences, are those where no variable appears outside the scope of a quantifier. A theory is a set of sentences. Variable-free terms, atoms, formulas, or theories are also called ground.
We regard structures as sets of atoms built over arbitrary non-empty domains, D; we denote by At(D, F , P ) the set of atomic sentences of D, F , P (if D = C , we obtain the set of atomic sentence of the language L = C , F , P ); 12 and we 12 We can think of the objects in D as additional constants; this approach allow us to use a simplified notation where the objects are not distinguished from their names. 13 That is, for every a ∈ C , I(a) ∈ D and for every f ∈ F with arity n, a mapping f I : D n → D is defined; so the recursive definition is given by
where: I| L is the restriction of the assignment I to the set of terms built with D and the constants and functions from L; and, for w ∈ {h, t}, I w | L is obtained by removing from I w any atom with predicates, constants or functions in L which are not in L.
Thus we can think of a here-and-there structure I as similar to a first-order classical model, but having two parts, or components, h and t that correspond to two different points or "worlds", 'here' and 'there', in the sense of Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic [39] , where the worlds are ordered by h < t. At each world w ∈ {h, t} one verifies a set of atoms I w in the expanded language for the domain D. We call the model static, since, in contrast, to say, intuitionistic logic, the same domain serves each of the worlds. Since h < t, whatever is verified at h remains true at t. The satisfaction relation for I is defined so as to reflect the two different components, so we write I, w | ϕ to denote that ϕ is true in I with respect to the w component. Although we only need to define the satisfaction relation in L = C , F , P , the recursive definition forces us to consider formulas from
Then | is extended recursively as follows 14 :
Truth of a sentence in a model is defined as follows:
The resulting logic is called Quantified Here-and-There Logic with static domains, and denoted in [1] by QHT s . In terms of satisfiability and validity this logic is equivalent to the logic introduced in [11] . A complete axiomatisation of QHT s can be obtained as follows [1] . We take the axioms and rules of first-order intuitionistic logic [39] and add the axiom of Hosoi [40] :
which determines 2-element here-and-there models in the propositional case, together with the axiom:
We also consider the equality predicate, . = / ∈ P , interpreted by the following condition for every w ∈ {h, t},
To obtain a complete axiomatisation, we need to add the axiom of "decidable equality"
We denote the resulting logic by QHT s = (L) and its inference relation by . More details can be found in [1] where in particular a strong completeness theorem is proved, that is: for any theory Γ and any formula ϕ, Γ ϕ iff Γ | ϕ.
As usual in first order logic, satisfiability and validity are independent of the signature.
This proposition allows us to omit reference to the signature in the logic so it can be denoted simply by QHT s = .
14 The following corresponds to the usual Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic given our assumptions about the two worlds h and t and the single domain D, see e.g. [39] .
In the context of logic programs, the following assumptions often play a role. In the case of both classical and QHT 
Equilibrium models
As in the propositional case, quantified equilibrium logic is based on a suitable notion of minimal model.
Definition 1.
Among quantified here-and-there structures we define the order P as follows:
If the subset relation holds strictly, we write '¡'.
Definition 2 (Equilibrium model). Let Π be a theory and I = (D, I), I
h , I t a model of Π .
I is said to be total if
2. I is said to be an equilibrium model of Π (or short, we say: "I is in equilibrium") if it is minimal under P among models of Π , and it is total. It is denoted by I | ∼ Π .
Notice that a total here-and-there model of a theory Π is equivalent to a classical first order model of Π .
The logic defined by the equilibrium models is called Quantified Equilibrium Logic (QEL) and it is also independent of the language, as seen by the following result.
Relation to other definitions of answer set
We assume the reader is familiar with the usual definitions of answer set based on Herbrand models and ground programs, e.g. [9] . Two variations of this semantics, the open [16] and generalised open answer set [41] semantics, consider non-ground programs and open domains, thereby relaxing the PNA.
For the present version of QEL the correspondence to answer sets can be summarised as follows (see [11, 12, 42] 
propositional equilibrium model of the grounding of ϕ with respect to the universe U .
By the usual convention, when Π is a logic program with variables we consider the models of its universal closure expressed as a set of logical formulas. It follows that if Π is a logic program (of any form), a total QHT s = model (D, I), T , T of Π is an equilibrium model of Π iff it is a generalised open answer set of Π in the sense of [41] . If we assume all models are UNA-models, we obtain the version of QEL found in [11] . There, the following relation of QEL to (ordinary) answer sets for logic programs with variables was established. If Π is a logic program, a total UNA-QHT
In [13] a new definition of stable model for arbitrary first-order formulas is provided, defining the property of being a stable model syntactically via a second-order condition. However [13] also shows that the new notion of stable model is equivalent to that of equilibrium model defined here. In a sequel to this paper, [14] applies the new definition and makes the following refinements. The stable models of a formula are defined as in [13] while the answer sets of a formula are those Herbrand models of the formula that are stable in the sense of [13] . Using this new terminology, it follows that in general stable models and equilibrium models coincide, while answer sets are equivalent to SNA-QHT s = models that are equilibrium models.
Since we capture a general notion of answer set for arbitrary first-order theories, our framework of QHT s = and QEL is widely applicable to knowledge representation problems reconstructed in different ASP languages. One area where there is less uniformity is the treatment of functions in ASP. This is still an active area of theoretical research and there are different approaches, e.g. [43] [44] [45] [46] . The introduction of function symbols in ASP systems is still at an early stage and most current solvers are not yet equipped with them. As we have seen, our approach here uses a rather classical notion of total function with decidable equality. The techniques used below could however be adapted, if necessary, to other treatments of functions in ASP.
Strong equivalence for theories
Before turning to the concept of synonymy in ASP, we review briefly the notion of strong equivalence that captures a robust form of equivalence for theories expressed in the same language. 15 I.e. a sentence in prenex form all of whose quantifiers are universal; see [11] for prenex forms in QHT s = .
The study of strong equivalence for logic programs and nonmonotonic theories was initiated in [22] . It has since become an important tool in ASP as a basis for program transformation and optimisation. We say that two sets Π 1 , Π 2 of first-order sentences are strongly equivalent if for every set Σ of first-order sentences, possibly of a larger signature, the sets Π 1 ∪ Σ , Π 2 ∪ Σ have the same equilibrium models. Under this definition we have: [1, 12] The following results will be useful later when the concepts of definability and interpretation are introduced. In them, we may assume that the formulas are in a suitable normal form, where functions only appear in atoms with equality and without nesting. Here and in the remainder of the paper we use the following notation and terminology. Boldface x stands for a tuple of variables, x = (x 1 , . . . , x 
If an atom in a formula of a theory or program is substituted by the formula described in the previous lemma, an equivalent formula is obtained and the resulting theory is strongly equivalent to the initial one. We can repeat this process for every function and constant to obtain the normal form described in the following proposition. Proof. (Idea.) The formula ψ is constructed by successive applications of the equivalence in Lemma 1 to replace every atom by an equivalent formula, starting from the innermost function or constant symbol in ϕ. P
The following example is taken from Enderton [47] and illustrates how this method works in a specific case:
Definability and interpretability
Our approach to synonymy uses the theory of definability and interpretations (between theories). In many respects it is close to the classical theory found in logic textbooks, e.g. [47] . However, we need to adapt this theory to our underlying non-classical logic and draw on metalogical properties of QHT s = . We start with some elements of definability theory.
Definition 3 (Explicit definability).
Let L = C , F , P be a first-order language.
• Let p / ∈ P be a new predicate symbol and Π a theory in L = C , F , P ∪ {p} . The symbol p is said to be explicitly
δ f is called the Defn of f .
• Let a / ∈ C be a new constant symbol and Π a theory in L = C ∪ {a}F , P . The symbol a is said to be explicitly definable 
The strong completeness theorem for QHT s = and Proposition 4 allows us to conclude the following characterisation of the implicit definability:
where q / ∈ P is a new predicate symbol with the same arity as p and Π[p/q] is the theory obtained by replacing every occurrence of p by q.
• Assuming that the formulas in Π are in the form described in Proposition 4, the function f is implicitly definable in Π
where q / ∈ Π is a new predicate symbol with the same arity as f plus one, and Π is built from Π by replacing every atom f (x) . = y by q(x, y).
In other words, p is implicitly definable if whenever the interpretation of the L predicates in models of Π is fixed, the interpretation of p becomes fixed also; similarly for functions and constants. The above definitions are readily extended to the case where several new predicate, function and constant symbols are definable in a theory. When the conditions for explicit and implicit definability are always equivalent, the logic in question is said to have the Beth property [48] . Proof. The Beth property is closely related to the property of interpolation. 16 It can be shown that the interpolation property implies the Beth property in all superintuionistic predicate logics [48] . Moreover, Ono [49] showed that interpolation holds in the logic QHT s of quantified here-and-there with constant domains. 17 Consequently, QHT s also has the Beth property.
Lastly, Maksimova showed in [50, 51] that adding pure equality axioms, e.g. decidable equality axiom, to any superintuitionistic logic preserves the interpolation and Beth properties (see also [48] ). Therefore from known results we can conclude that QHT s = also possesses the Beth property. However, since these results are generally stated in the literature for function-free languages, we need to adapt them to our present situation, as follows. 
Trivially, there exists a bijection, Φ, between the models of Π and the models of Π , which is defined using the following relation:
To verify the Beth property, let us assume that f is explicitly definable in Π , then 16 A logic is said to have the interpolation property if whenever ϕ → ψ there exists a sentence ξ (the interpolant) such that ϕ → ξ and ξ → ψ where all predicate and constant symbols of ξ are contained in both ϕ and ψ . 17 Ono's axiomatisation of QHT s uses the constant domains axiom ∀x(α(x) ∨ β) → (∀xα(x) ∨ β), as well as alternative axioms for propositional here-and- 
The other direction of the Beth property is proved analogously. P An interpretation τ , induces a mapping, also denoted by τ , from L 1 -formulas to L 2 -formulas: first, a formula is converted in the form described in Proposition 4 and then
Interpretations between theories

Definition 5 (Interpretation between languages).
Let L 1 = C 1 , F 1 , P 1 and L 2 = C 2 ,1. τ (x . = y) = x . = y, 2. τ ( f (x) . = y) = δ τ f (x, y) for every function f , 3. τ (a . = x) = δ τ a (x), for every constant a, 4. τ (p(x)) = δ τ p (x), 5. τ is extended recursively by τ (ϕ ∧ ψ) = τ (ϕ) ∧ τ (ψ), τ (ϕ ∨ ψ) = τ (ϕ) ∨ τ (ψ), τ (ϕ → ψ) = τ (ϕ) → τ (ψ), τ (¬ϕ) = ¬τ (ϕ),
τ (∀xϕ) = ∀xτ (ϕ) and τ (∃xϕ) = ∃xτ (ϕ).
Definition 6 (Induced definitions).
For an interpretation τ , we define the set of definitions induced by τ as:
Definition 7 (Interpretation into a theory).
If τ is an interpretation of L 1 in L 2 and Π 2 is a theory in L 2 , τ is said to be an interpretation of L 1 in Π 2 if the following conditions hold:
2. for every function f ∈ F 1 ,
Any interpretation τ of L 1 in Π 2 induces a mapping Φ τ from the set of models of Π 2 to the set of L 1 -structures: if
t is defined as follows:
, for every w ∈ {h, t}.
Lemma 2. The mapping Φ τ is well defined.
Proof. The condition (4) in the definition of interpretation guarantees that J is well defined over the set of constants and condition (5) guarantees that f J is well defined for every f ∈ F 1 . P 18 Any languages can be made disjoint by renaming. Alternatively we can allow that L 1 and L 2 have a common sublanguage which any translations simply leave untouched, i.e. the sublanguage is always translated by the identity map.
On the other hand, it is easy to check by induction that for any L 1 -sentence ϕ, any w ∈ {h, t} and any model I of Π 2 :
and therefore 
For interpretations between theories, the mapping Φ τ maps models of Π 2 to models of Π 1 . 
Generally speaking the map Φ τ associated with an interpretation τ of L 1 in an L 2 -theory does not preserve the ordering P between L 2 -structures. However the following properties are easy to check and will be useful later: To prove (ii) let us consider a total structure I and I P I; then using (6) and the definition of P we have that for any
and so Φ τ (I ) and Φ τ (I) agree at their t points. On the other hand, by
, t | ϕ and therefore Φ τ (I ) P Φ τ (I), since I is total. P Definition 9 (Faithful interpretation). An interpretation τ of Π 1 in Π 2 is said to be faithful if the converse of (8) also holds, i.e. we have
. (10) As in classical interpretability theory, further special cases of interpretation can be obtained by imposing additional conditions on the syntactic and semantic translations. τ (ϕ(t) ),
All of this is valid even if p(t) = f (s)
. = a, and thus we can conclude that f I 1 = f I 2 for every f . Therefore I 1 = I 2 and Φ τ is injective.
To show that (iii) implies (ii), one applies the Beth property. First, we shall show that in L 2 ∪ L 1 the theory Π = Π 2 ∪ τ implicitly defines the atoms of L 2 : let M 1 and M 2 be two models of
• By Proposition 1, the restrictions M 1 | L 2 and M 2 | L 2 are models of Π 2 .
• For every atomic formula
•
is an atomic sentence of L 1 and w ∈ {h, t}, then 
Now, we can establish claim (ii). Let M be a model of Π 2 and let us consider the extension to the language L 1 ∪ L 2 defined
; so M + is a model of Π and, by (11) , it is also a model of every definition and thus, for every basic atom q(t) in L 2 and w ∈ {h, t},
, by definition of M + and induction. By induction, for every L 2 -formula ψ(x), we deduce that M, w | ψ(t) ↔ τ (σ (ψ(t))) and therefore M | ∀x(ψ(x) ↔ τ (σ (ψ(x)))). P An interpretation satisfying any of (i)-(iii) of Proposition 7 is said to be surjective. Such interpretations preserve the property of being an equilibrium model, in the following sense.
Proof. Since τ is surjective, the map Φ τ is an injection of Π 2 models into Π 1 models. Applying the definition of equilibrium and Lemma 3 establishes the result. P
Synonymy and equivalence
We are now ready to consider our main concept. An interpretation τ that is both surjective and faithful is said to be a bijective interpretation of Π 1 in Π 2 .
Definition 10 (Synonymy).
If there exists a bijective interpretation τ of Π 1 in Π 2 (i.e. a surjective and faithful interpretation), we say that Π 1 is synonymous with Π 2 with respect to τ .
It is easy to verify that if τ is a bijective interpretation of Π 1 in Π 2 , then its inverse interpretation σ is an interpretation of Π 2 in Π 1 and it is also bijective. In fact we have:
Theorem 2. Synonymy is an equivalence relation.
Proof.
• Reflexivity is trivial using τ = id.
• To prove symmetry, let us consider a bijective interpretation τ of Π 1 in Π 2 and its inverse interpretation σ of L 2 in L 1 ; to conclude symmetry it is enough to prove that σ is an interpretation of Π 2 in Π 1 and that it is also bijective: -To prove that σ is an interpretation of L 2 in Π 1 we must check the conditions (4) and (5) for σ . Let a be a constant of L 2 ; applying the condition (ii) of Proposition 7 to the formula ψ(x) = x . = a we have
and thus
, which is the condition (4) for σ . Condition (5) can be proved analogously.
-σ is an interpretation of Π 2 in Π 1 and it is faithful:
-σ is surjective: in particular, we can verify condition (ii) in Proposition 7 where τ is the inverse of σ :
• Let us consider a bijective interpretation τ 1 of Π 1 in Π 2 and a bijective interpretation τ 2 of Π 2 in Π 3 . To establish transitivity, we are going to prove that τ 2 • τ 1 is a bijective interpretation of Π 1 in Π 3 .
-τ 2 • τ 1 is an interpretation of Π 1 in Π 3 and it is faithful because τ 1 and τ 2 are: Given an inverse interpretation σ , we can map L 1 -structures I to L 2 -structures Φ σ (I) in the same way as before. It is
however equality need not hold for other structures (outside of the class of Π 2 -models), even in the case of classical logic. So in general Π 2 need not be logically equivalent to τ (Π 1 ).
To see this consider the following example. Let Π 1 be a theory in the signature comprising just the unary predicate p and let be Π 2 be a theory in the unary predicates p, q. Suppose that Π 1 has no axioms and Π 2 has the single axiom ∀x(p(x) ↔ q(x)). Then we can interpret Π 1 in Π 2 by the identity interpretation τ and Π 2 in Π 1 by interpreting p and q as p. This is clearly a synonymy. However τ (Π 1 ) comprises just the tautologies in p. So it cannot prove ∀x(p(x) ↔ q(x)).
Verifying the adequacy conditions
Let us now consider synonymy in light of the adequacy conditions D1-D6. We have already dealt with the basic cases of translation and associated semantic correspondence. Let us now consider the sense in which two synonymous theories can be considered equivalent as in requirement D3. 
Proof. By Theorem 1, it is enough to prove that Π 2 ∪ τ and Π 1 ∪ σ have the same models. Let 
it is easy to conclude by induction that
On the other hand, by item (ii) in Proposition 7 applied to τ , M | ∀x(q(x) ↔ τ (δ σ q (x))) for all q ∈ P 2 , and thus, for every 
Next we turn to condition D4. 
. Next we show that τ is faithful, that is that
Finally Φ τ is injective over the set of models of Π 2 and therefore over the set of models of Π 2 ∪ τ (Π) . So τ is a bijective interpretation of Π 1 ∪ Π onto Π 2 ∪ τ (Π). P
A case study from causal action theory
To illustrate how our concepts can be applied in practice, we look at an example taken from causal action theory. This is a real application scenario where problems of equivalence arise in practice. The case study comes from [19] where Balduccini and Gelfond propose an architecture for a software agent that operates a physical device and is capable of monitoring, testing and repairing the device's components. Based on the theory described in a suitable action language, they present simplified definitions of several notions, such as symptom and diagnosis, in such a way that it is possible to give a simple account of the agent's behaviour in which many of the agent's tasks are reduced to computing the stable models of logic programs. We choose here the program built by the authors to find candidate diagnoses using answer set programming; to do that, a System Description of a Diagnostic Domain and a specific history is given. We only include here a short and informal description, for detailed explanations the reader should consult the referred paper [19] .
We call L 2 the language used in [19] and we use Π 2 to denote our rendering of the program described in Section 4 of [19] . The language includes the natural numbers and the successor function; additionally, among the constants, we have a set of actions, a set of laws, a set of fluents and a function over the set of fluents: is the negation of the fluent . Several predicates are used to fix the specific role of every constant and the basic relations among them: The fluents and the actions occur in specific instants and some predicates express that:
holds(l, n) (the fluent l holds at instant n), obs(l, n) (the fluent l was observed to be true at moment n), hpd(a, n) (the action a was observed to happen at moment n), o(a, n) (the action a occurs at moment n).
Two relations, hpd and o, are used to distinguish between actions observed and actions hypothesised respectively.
We re-write the rules of [19] as logical formulas separated by commas, understood to be universally closed (we omit the quantifiers for simplicity). Some formulas are included in order to describe the effects of causal laws and constraints, some establish the relationship between observations and the basic relations, and guarantee that observations do not contradict the agent's expectations. The fifth formula rules out inconsistent states. a) determined by the laws, actions and fluents defining the Description System, and prec_h is an auxiliary predicate which will be defined later.
The program Π 0 does not yet include the rules that we want to focus on in our example; in fact we consider the program Π 2 given by
The goal of these additional rules is to define the relation prec_h: for every law d, the atom prec_h (d, x) says that all the preconditions of d are satisfied at moment x. This relation is defined via an auxiliary relation all_h(d, i, t) which holds if the preconditions l i , . . . ,l m of d are satisfied at moment t; additionally, we need the predicate prec_rei (d, n, l) to say that the nth precondition of d is l and the function np(d) that returns the number of preconditions of the law d and its interpretation is fixed.
Michael Gelfond has suggested the following problem. 19 We know that it is also possible to manage the preconditions of a law using lists, though these are not available in most answer set solvers. Alternatively we can use the formulation without lists. The problem is to prove that both representation are equivalent.
We are going to introduce the alternative representation as a new theory Π 1 in a language L 1 and then use the synonymy theory to answer the question. To approach this problem we consider a language L 1 that only differs from L 2 with respect to two predicates: hold(x, y) 20 and prec(x, y) will be used to define prec_h instead of all_h(x, y, z), prec_num (x, y) and prec_rei(x, y, z). In the theory Π 1 we will use the standard functions and predicates necessary to work with lists; we assume that these functions and predicates are available in L 1 and in L 2 ; moreover, we suppose that both theories include the necessary rules to define these predicates. So, nil denotes the empty lists and cons(x, y) is the list with head x and tail y. The predicate nth(n, , x) is read as "the nth term of is x"; the predicate member(x, ) is read as "x is a member of "; the predicate length( , n) is read as "n is the length of "; the predicate append( 1, 2, 3) is read as " 3 is the concatenation of 1 and 2". In the following theory, denotes the list [l 1 , . . . ,l m ] 
To prove that τ is an interpretation of Π 1 in Π 2 , we must check that if I is a model of Π 2 then I is a model of τ (ϕ) for every ϕ ∈ Π 1 . We give the details for some formulas: •
This formula is trivially valid if y ranges from the set of lists of preconditions and thus we can assume that y = [v 1 , . . . , v m ] and the formula becomes equivalent to
where m = np(x). This formula can be deduced from Π 2 ; moreover, it could be easily deduced from the following subset: 19 In a personal communication to the authors. 20 Notice that the hold predicate is distinct from the holds predicate.
The proof of the faithfulness condition for τ is similar. Finally, the interpretation τ is surjective because it verifies condition (iii) in Proposition 7. This is easy to prove by considering that the translation τ • σ is prec_rei (x, y, z) ↔ ∃u nth( y, u, z) ∧ ∀z∀v nth(z, u, v) → prec_rei(x, z, v) , all_h(x, y, z) ↔ ∃u∃v∃w ∀v∀w nth (v, u, w) → prec_rei(x, v, w) ∧ length(w, y − 1) ∧ append (w, v, u) ∧ ∀w member(w, v) → holds (w, z) and the rule nth(x, y, z) → member(z, y) is included in both theories.
Discussion: what synonymy is not
Our approach to synonymy has been to try and capture a strong or robust notion of equivalence for programs and theories expressed in different vocabularies. We can regard this equivalence as amounting to a "sameness of meaning". It is important to point out, however, that this kind of equivalence does not mean equality in all aspects. Since the semantic correspondence between synonymous theories preserves the equilibrium property in both directions, such theories will always produce equivalent answers to equivalent queries. In this sense they are the essentially same. But they may differ in many other respects. In ASP nonmonotonic inference can be of either skeptical or credulous kind. The latter is appropriate in cases where each answer set represents a problem solution, the former in cases where we are interested in derivability in all answer sets. In either case, synonymous theories will yield equivalent answers. For instance if we denote the collection of equilibrium models of a theory Π by Mod E (Π), then Π entails ϕ in the skeptical sense, in symbols 
and analogously for σ . A similar relation holds for credulous inference, so in general we can claim that
• Synonymous theories yield equivalent answers to equivalent queries.
In KRR contexts in other words, synonymous theories will produce equivalent plans, diagnoses, explanations, and so forth.
However from an operational or practical point of view synonymous theories may differ. We saw in the introduction how one might prefer one representation to another, equivalent one, with regard to computational efficiency, elaboration tolerance, or other grounds of simplicity and efficiency. This is not surprising. Even strongly equivalent theories in the same language need not be equally simple or efficient in computational terms.
An interesting area for future study is the way in which different kinds of interpretability or synonymy relations preserve properties, including computational properties, of the theories and their models. In the case of interpretations in classical logic, many results are known (see e.g. [36] ). Typical observations are that surjective interpretations τ preserve the elementary equivalence of models, while definitions τ of a special syntactic kind can preserve properties like homomorphisms between models. We do not yet have comparable results in the setting of ASP. However we may conjecture that interpretations preserving the P-relation between structures could be relevant in some cases for the transfer of certain computational properties from one theory to another. 21 
Literature and related work
In classical logic there is a large and well-developed body of work on interpretability dating from the 1950s. The first systematic treatments of synonymous theories in this context can be found in [53, 35] , a more algebraic approach can be found in [54] . The classical version of Proposition 7 is essentially contained in [53] , though a more detailed statement and proof can be found in [36] . In our approach we have partly followed the style of Pinter in [36] , however that paper does not give an adequate account of the translation of expressions with function symbols. Good textbook treatments of interpretability can be found in [47, 55] . Outside the field of mathematics, the classical theory of interpretability and definitional equivalence was extended and applied to empirical forms of knowledge in [56, 33, 32] ; see also [34] for a more recent account of translatability issues in such contexts. The theory of interpretations and equivalence in non-classical logics is less developed, however especially in the case of superintuitionistic logics much is known about key properties, such as interpolation and Beth, on which interpretability theory depends, see e.g. [50, 51, 57] . In the context of nonmonotonic logic programming the study of different kinds of equivalence between programs is relatively new (see references in Section 1). Until now the case of programs in different languages has only been considered in [31] . There has been some discussion of the role and properties of definitions in ASP in [58, 59] .
Concluding remarks
We have shown how formal approaches to intertheory relations developed for mathematical and scientific knowledge can be applied to systems of logic programming and nonmonotonic reasoning used for practical problem solving and knowledge representation. In particular, we have described how the theory of interpretability and definitional equivalence can be applied in the context of first-order logic programs under answer set semantics and nonmonotonic theories in the system of quantified equilibrium logic. In this setting we regard theories as synonymous if each is bijectively interpretable in the other, and we have characterised this relation in different ways. We also showed that this reconstruction satisfies a number of intuitive, informal adequacy conditions.
Our approach should be directly applicable to all the usual systems of ASP as well as specialised languages such as action languages built on them. In addition our general method should be transferable to other knowledge representation formalisms based on logic. Specific characterisations of synonymy will depend on the logics concerned and their metalogical properties.
The applicability of what is essentially a classical logical approach in a non-classical context relies on two essential features: first, our underlying logic has several properties such as Beth that help to relate the syntax to the semantics of definitions and translations; secondly, in ASP and equilibrium logic the strong concept of equivalence between theories is fully captured in the underlying monotonic logic (quantified here-and-there). This allows us to define a robust or modular concept of equivalence across different languages.
Several avenues are left open for future exploration. For example, one might want to study other kinds of interpretability relations, such as where the formula δ τ p defining a predicate p may contain additional parameters, or where the semantic mapping Φ τ may relate models with different domains. Secondly, one might search for simple structural properties on the models of two programs or theories that are equivalent to or sufficient for synonymy. Thirdly, based on these or other properties of the theories concerned, it would be useful to develop systems for checking synonymy, thereby extending current methods for checking strong equivalence in the case of programs in the same language [28, 26] .
